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I.  Introduction 
There is a growing literature showing that social context and social comparison can 
significantly affect consumption patterns, labor supply, savings, bargaining, cooperation, 
competition and other kinds of economic behavior.
1  Surprisingly few contributions, 
however, investigate risk taking in a social context.  One recent and notable exception is 
Bohnet et al. (2008), who investigated laboratory trust and dictator games in six countries 
and find that people are less willing to take a risk when the source of the risk is another 
person rather than nature (see our concluding section and Bohnet et al. for other relevant 
literature).  Yet, in their data, social comparison does not seem to affect risk taking.  
When comparing an individual decision problem with a risky dictator game, extending 
the risk to a recipient should have decreased risk taking if choosers are motivated by 
inequality aversion, or increased risk taking if they are motivated by altruism or 
efficiency motives – but there is no difference.  Bohnet et al. (2008) speculate that the 
different social motives might have cancelled out, or that such social concerns are not so 
important in their environment.   
In this note, we provide evidence that social comparison significantly affects risk taking 
in simple and very elementary binary decision problems with social context, 
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complementing Bohnet et al.’s results in various ways. More specifically, we find that 
decision makers generally tend to be more risk-averse when the risk is not only born 
individually but extended to others.  However, when the safe option implies inequality, 
especially unfavorable inequality, the risky option becomes significantly more attractive.  
On the other hand, similar to what has been observed by Bohnet et al., the inequality 
resulting from the risky choice does not affect risk taking.  After having described our 
design and findings in the next section, we discuss the patterns in the concluding section. 
 
Choice   Options  Data 
(#Risky out 
of 26 obs.) 
Safe Risky 
50% 50% 
cho rec cho rec  cho rec   
A 1  7  - 16 - 0 - 18 
2 7  7 16 16 0 0 15 
3 7  16 16 16 0 0 19 
4 7  0 16 16 0 0 15 
5 7  7 16 0 0 16 13 
6 7  16 16 0 0 16 20 
7 7  0 16 0 0 16 16 
B 1  9  - 16 - 0 - 11 
2 9  9 16 16 0 0 9 
3 9  16 16 16 0 0 14 
4 9  0 16 16 0 0 10 
5 9  9 16 0 0 16 7 
6 9  16 16 0 0 16 9 
7 9  0 16 0 0 16 11 
 
Table 1. Payoffs for each choice problem, and data  
 
II.  Experimental design and findings 
Design.  Like Bohnet et al. (2008) we choose binary decision tasks between and risky and 
a safe option, and we (partly) compare ‘parallel’ decision tasks in individual and dictator-
game like experiments.  Unlike Bohnet et al., we do not employ the strategy method, we 
keep the source of the risk (nature) and all other parameters of the risky option constant 
and, for this class of games, we systematically investigate a larger range of binary choices. 
Specifically, Table 1 lists all 14 binary choice problems in our study.  Each choice is 
between a safe and a risky option and made by the chooser (“cho” in the table).  With the   3
exception of two tasks (A/B1), all choices are made in a social context in the sense that 
they also affect the payoff of an anonymous recipient (“rec” in the table).   
The tasks can be separated into Block A, where each safe option yielded a payoff of 7€ 
for the chooser, and into Block B, where the safe option yielded 9€ for the chooser.  
There are no other differences between blocks.  In particular, the risky option in all cases 
yielded a 50% chance of receiving 16€ and otherwise zero for both chooser and recipient.  
Thus, a risk-neutral payoff-maximizier, who does not care about social context, would 
always choose the risky option for all problems in Block A and the safe option for all 
problems in Block B.   
The choices within each block differ with respect to social comparison.  Compared to 
A/B1, in A/B2 the chooser’s risk is extended to the recipient, who receives the same 
payoff as the chooser regardless of the chooser’s decision and the outcome of the chance 
move.  The next tasks imply an unfair safe outcome, which is either favorable (A/B3) or 
unfavorable (A/B4) to the chooser, while keeping the risky option unchanged. The last 
two problems in each block replicate the two preceding social context problems with the 
exception that the risky outcomes are all very unequal (payoffs are perfectly negatively 
correlated).   
Experiment.  We conducted two classroom sessions with undergraduates in business 
administration and economics at the University of Cologne with in total 663 subjects, 364 
choosers and 299 recipients.  Each subject participated in only one decision problem, in 
only one role (no strategy method), with no repetition. All pairing of choosers and 
recipients was random and anonymous, and all outcomes were paid anonymously, 
without any signature or other identification of subjects needed (see also instructions in 
the Appendix).  This procedure yielded 26 independent observations for each of the 14 
binary choice problems.
2  
Results. The last column in Table 1 shows the number of choosers who take the risky 
option in the corresponding task.  Given Bohnet et al.’s (2008) observation, we start out 
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with the null hypothesis that, keeping the source of the risk constant, social preferences 
do not matter for risk taking.  The following three findings summarize our main 
observations. 
 
Finding 1 [Individual versus collective risk]. Risk taking is (partly) affected by 
extending the risk to another subject. 
We use a sign test to investigate whether risk taking is affected by adding social context.  
There are 12 comparisons (A/B1 against A/B2-7), of which 8 show lower rates of risk 
taking in a social context, 3 higher rates and one is a tie; sign test two-tailed p-value = 
0.227.  However, all of the higher rates come from comparisons where the safe option 
implies unfavorable inequality for the choosers – an observation we will come back to in 
the next paragraph.  Removing these four treatments (A/B3 and A/B6), seven 
comparisons show lower rates in a social context and there is one tie; sign test two-tailed 
p-value = 0.016.  Here, the probability of choosing risk is 56% with social risk compared 
to 49% without social context.  In particular, observe that in all comparisons with 
identical safe and risky outcomes for the recipient (compare A/B1 with A/B2 and A/B5), 
choosers are more risk averse with social context.  Thus, disregarding cases where the 
safe option yields unfavorable inequality, decisions tend to be more risk averse when the 
risk is also born by another person. 
 
Finding 2 [Social comparison].  For decisions with social context, there is more risk 
taking when the safe option implies an unfair outcome.  In particular, the risky option is 
chosen most frequently when the safe option yields unfavorable inequality. 
Holding all other parameters fixed, there are eight comparisons in each block (A/B2,5 
against A/B3,4,6,7).  Taken together, 14 are in line with the first part of the finding and 
two comparisons are a tie.  The sign test two-tailed p-value is smaller than 0.001.  The 
percentage of risky choices when the safe option yields unequal payoffs is 55% versus 
42% when the safe option is fair.  Regarding the second part of Finding 2, there are again 
eight comparisons in each block (A/B3,6 against A/B2,4,5,7).  In total, 13 are in favor,   5
two are inconsistent, and one comparison is a tie; sign test two-tailed p-value = 0.007.  
The percentage of risky choices when the safe option yields unfavorable inequality is 
60%, versus 46% else.  
 
Finding 3 [Risk correlation]. The attractiveness of the risky option does not depend on 
the associated degree of payoff inequality. 
Keeping the safe option fixed, there are six comparisons of risky options where payoffs 
are either perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated (A/B2-5, A/B3-6, A/B4-
7).  Three comparisons are in favor of a negative payoff correlation, and the other three 
are in favor of the opposite.  The average percentages of risky choices are 53% for 
positive correlation and 49% for negative correlation. 
 
III. Discussion  
Our findings complement Bohnet et al.’s results.  For one, we find that social comparison 
significantly affects risk taking, in a way that goes beyond what is captured by simple 
theories of social preferences.  Finding 1 shows that the willingness to take risk is 
reduced when the risk is also born by others; people seem more resistant to imposing 
risks on others than on themselves.
3  However, this only holds as long as the safe option 
does not imply an unfavorable relative standing for the chooser, which makes the risky 
option more attractive (Finding 2).  Observe that the latter result holds even though, in 
our environment, the unfair safe option is more efficient.   
Finding 2 is in line with models of inequality aversion and, moreover, with the idea by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that people tend to be risk-seeking when their payoffs fall 
below some point of reference.  To our knowledge, however, no previous experiment or 
field study has identified the role of social comparison in risk taking in controlled 
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environments.  Bohnet et al. (2008) did not find social comparison effects (more on this 
next paragraph).  Field and survey studies often take into account income, wealth and 
some other social parameters (Barsky et al. 1997, Donkers et al. 2001, Dohmen et al. 
2005, Haisley et al. 2008).  For instance, it has been found that lotteries are most 
appealing to the poor, probably because lottery tickets may be seen as a vehicle to correct 
for low-income status (Clotfelter and Cook 1989, Haisley et al. 2008), which appears to 
be in line with our results.  Other studies, however, consistently found that low income or 
wealth levels decrease the willingness to take risks, probably because high income 
protects against the impact of bad outcomes (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2005).  Part of the 
reason for such mixed results might be that the field studies typically do not (and perhaps 
cannot) control for the relevant peer group of the respondents for social comparison; e.g., 
a wealthy investment banker may be more willing to take risks if her colleagues in her 
peer group have closed more successful deals recently.  The advantage of our 
experimental study is that social comparison effects can be identified by controlling the 
relevant peer groups (chooser and recipient).   
Our Finding 3 suggests that it does not matter for the attractiveness of the risky option 
whether the risky outcomes are fair or unfair.  This contradicts inequality aversion, but is 
in line with the Bohnet et al. (2008) finding that inequality, when the result of a chance 
move, does not affect risk taking.  Together with Finding 2 (along with other evidence in 
the experimental social comparison literature), this suggests that a random payoff 
allocation changes the way unequal payoff distributions are evaluated (see also Bolton et 
al. 2005): an unequal outcome appears more acceptable when brought about by a chance 
move.   
Overall, our results complement Bohnet et al.’s findings by showing that, beyond the 
potential social context activated through the source of risk, social comparison can 
significantly affect risk taking.  
   7
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Appendix: Instructions 
General Information 
You are participating in an experimental economics study. In case you have any queries, 
please raise your hand at any time and we will come to your place. Any kind of 
communication with other participants is strictly prohibited. 
In this study you can earn money as described in these instructions. Your earnings 
will be paid out in the next lecture on presentation of the attached certificate showing 
your identification number. 
 
[WITHOUT SOCIAL CONTEXT] 
Decision  
Please choose between the following two alternatives:  
 
Alternative 1: You get €8. 
 
Alternative 2: The rolling of a dice decides on your payout: 
•  In case of a 1, 2, or 3 (50% probability),   
you get €16.  
•  In case of a 4, 5, or 6 (50% probability),   
you get €0. 
 
[WITH SOCIAL CONTEXT] 
Decision 
You are randomly assigned to another person in this room. One of the two persons is 
Participant A and the other one is Participant B. If your Identification Number begins 
with the letter A, you are Participant A. Otherwise, you are Participant B.  
 
Participant A has to choose between the following two alternatives:  
 
Alternative 1: Participant A gets €7 and Participant B gets €7. 
 
Alternative 2: The rolling of a dice decides on the payoff: 
•  In case of a 1, 2, or 3 (50% probability),    
Participant A gets €16 and Participant B gets €16.  
•  In case of a 4, 5, or 6 (50% probability),    







alternative:   9
The dice will be rolled clearly visible for everyone as soon as all participants have made 
their decision.  
Participant B does not have to make any decision. If you are Participant B, we 
nevertheless ask you to check off the alternative you would have chosen if you had been 
Participant A. 
 Take your time and make sure that you fully understand these instructions. Then 
check off the preferred alternative. All decisions and payments are confidential. None of 
the other participants gets to know the amount of your payment. Moreover, none of the 
other participants gets to know which other participant he/she was assigned to, neither 
during nor after the study. 
 
 
 